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Absb·act 
This paper introduces conceptual relations 
tlrat syntlresizc utilitarian and logical con­
cepts, extending the logics of preference of 
[{escher. 
We define first, in the context of a possible­
worlds modeL constraint-dependent mea­
sures that quantify the relative quality of al­
temative solutions of reasoning problems or 
the relative desirabi lity of various policies in 
coutrol. decision, and planning problerns. 
\Yc sho\\' tbat. these llH�asures rnay be inter­
preted as truth values in a multivaluecl logic 
ami propose rnechanisms for the representa­
tion of complex constraints as combinations 
of simpler restrictions. These extended log­
iced operations permit also the combination 
and Rggregation of goal-specific quality l11ea.­
sures into global measnres of utility . We iden­
tify also relations that represent differential 
prd!'rcnces hdll"ecn ill t ernativ<' solutions and 
rel<1tc thcrrr to t.IJ<• pr< ' viously defined desir­
ability tne<IS\nes. 
l'xt<-udirrg convcrrtionalmodal logic formnla­
t iot1s, we int.roduce st.rttct urcs f'or t.l1c reprc­
scttL<tt.ion of igllortlttcc' tthout. tile ut.ility of <:d­
t.crt t <lt iv<� solut.iolls. Finally, \\'C ex<lll linc rela­
t.iolls hct.wee!l t.hcs<· concepts and sitnilarity­
bas<�d semarrtic nrod<.'is of fuzzy logic. 
1 Introduction 
Tlw ability of logic-based proccdmes to represent 
k JJ uwledgc elctttcnts of rat.ht�r diverse characteristics 
1vlrilc id e ntif"ying, by corrstructii'C proof , solutions of a 
wide 1·aricty of proiJ!cms is tire major rcasorr for their 
<tppt'al HS the base::- of a class of artificial intelligence 
tttct lto<lologic'S. 
:\ristotlc, who established logic as the discipline 
concenrc"l with the relations between the truth-
values of propositions, wa.s cdso, as not cd by 
Rescher [Rescher 67], the first student of the notion of 
preferability ( "the worthier of choice"), also a rmjor 
element of any problem-solving approaclr. 
A large amount of interest has been rcccrrtly express.· <I 
in the artificial intelligence community about the role 
of the concept of utility in the solution of various prob­
lems. Hobbs et a!. [Hobbs 90] have, for example, re­
cently proposed measures of cost to assess t.hc quality 
of interpretations of linguistic utterances. Tire work 
of Russell and Wefald [Russell 89] also exemplifies re­
cent interest on the applicability of dccision-tlreorctic 
principles to the control of reasoning processes. �lca­
sures of preference have a.lso been used in int.(:lligcnt 
decision planners to control the relaxation of "ei<Jstic"' 
constraints [Fox 90]. 
The appeal that utilitarian notions and structures have 
as an important element of the problem-solving pro­
cess lies on their ability to add to the classical logicist 
concept of rationality--the sound derivation of conclu­
sions fron1 preinises-- pragrnatic princi pies or rat.ion;d 
behavior that aid in the ev<Jiuation of t Ire desirability 
and utility of botlr assnmpt.ions an d ccJIIclrrsions. ol"­
ten assisting to detel'lnine the rdatin: it nportancc or 
various constraints. FurtiH'rlllOr<_�, at a tnel.arc;-t:'IOJlillg 
level, utilita.ria.n cotisi<kr<_tt.iotts an: intjHJrl.<!lJt. clcJJli'IJI:-> 
to guide reasoning J.Hoccsscs nlong litw:-; t.l1at. nrc lik('­
lier to produce the truth values of targ<'L hypotlrcs<'S. 
In this paper, we advancc' a view of trutlr '" util­
ity that follows naturally from considerations about 
the relative desirability of alternative soltrtions a11d 
that effectively integrates both notions hy mc<HIS of' 
multivaluecl logic approaches. Our approaclr is ill­
fluenced by the "logics of prcf(,rcncc" proposed hy 
Rescher [Reschcr 67] where tlw truth-value (usually 
rnea.sureJ in a. [0, 1] scale ) of a constra.illing pro posit ioH 
p represents tire desirability of p comirrg ahorrt, or, irr 
other \\'Ords: the clegrc(� by wl1ich ]J i� <� "good 1.hing." 
While being close in spirit to the S<ltll<' nrrrlt il·;ducd­
logic ideas, the approach followed by Uris paper diff<'rs 
from that of llescher in a number of srrhstanlial rc-
ga.rds. 
First., we seck to develop a 1nodcl t.lu_d associates a util­
ity 1ncasurc. Inea.suring the rclat.ive goodncss-- --froln a 
particular perspective� of the .solutious of a problem 
";ill other things being equal," to each const raint that 
defines the problem. Our measures quantify prcfer­
<'ncc between alternatives (e.g., being on this or the 
other side of the street) from the limited perspective 
of a single constraint (e.g., we want to hire a taxi). 
Tilis formulation represents a substantial departure 
from Rescher's formalism where utilities are simply 
f11nct.ions of propositions that measure their "global" 
relative desirability, regardless of context. This global 
n1casure, in Rescher's approach, is given by an a.vera.ge 
or cont.ext-specific JesirabiJit.y values: <l l ClSSUI11ption 
t IJ<t!. ]e;HI:-:: to t.lw 11arrow collclu;-;ioll t.l1at. such nleasures 
ttllts l !tCrYe the properties of" probability distributions. 
Second, hy introduct,ion of lltodalities, we enh;rnce 
t ]J(' nliue of Inult.ivalu��d-log;ic sclicJnes, genera liz­
in!', both our previous scm<rutic models of fuzzy 
logic [Ruspiui \II] and providing a pract.ical way to rep­
resent ignor;mce about the potential utility of certain 
cl1oices. 
l:inally, we provide bas<>s for the rational combination 
of" 11ntlt.iplr, goal-specific, tllcasurcs of utility into a 
glol><rl prefcre11cc rd;ttion tl�<rt rcpn'.'<onts their relative 
illJ{lOJ't.(IJJCe. 
Hey(JJJd otJr ohjecti\'(_' of' cxp;u1ding; and exploring the 
not.icms propos('cl hy Ht-�schcr, \\"(·' S<'Ck to establish Cllld 
study formal bases for utilit.y-ori�:ntecl approaches to 
prohknr-solviug that depart from classical "optimiza­
tion"' methods that maximize a prespecifteclllleasure of 
p<·rformance subject to "hard'' constraints. Our for­
malism, which is also inspired by recent studies on 
O[Wrations research and the foundations of utility the­
ory [Bra.chingcr 00L regards every constraint on the so­
lution of I:1 prohkm as a somcc of differential pref­
('rcJJcc r('lations hetwce11 nltcrJtati,·cs. wllich arc then 
t r;HJed of!' hy {-\ IJW\.;HI'i\SO!Wl' Cttpahle or cxp/aillillp,· it.s 
.'-'oltlliol! ratic)]J(l]c: a t;tsk h('y01Hl !.]w ;Ihility orclll'n'll1 
upt ittiiz;tt.ioJJ t.echtiiqttc.". Furt.!Jt_'I'IJJOI'<:. each such con­
st l'<l.int.\t;-\S a '·L\.rg;<:t vah.l(',·· i.(' . . a qH\-\IItitl\t.ivc charac­
l<'riz;Jt.ioll of' t.IH' "ideal .. s\.;Jl(' nf aft'nirs froJJI t.ht;' ;-;i11g;lc 
perspect jy(' of t.ha.t. ]'(';..;t.rict.i\·c s!.at.<'lllellt.  
011r model is based 011 til<' mapping of each potential 
solttt.ioit of' a problcn1 t.o a set of nuinbcrs, eaclt rep­
resent iug the c\<Osiral>ility or that altcrtllltive from tire 
\"ii'\Ypoint of' a .  difl"ercllt cotJ:-il.raint.  This perspective 
ou l.lw r<_'iL")OJiillg prohktll lc;Hls to a Hllifonn clt<u·ac­
lt'rizat.ion of' l[tt' rolt' tJuJt COliStraitJt.s of din�l'SC t.ypc 
It;[\"(' Oil the' dd.('J"l!tinat.iotJ or t.]J(' :-'lliUlhilit.y of solu-
1 i ()J J...;. 
Tlwr<' IS no JH'r'd, for t'Xillltpl<'. t.o ilSsocia.l .l' t.wo llH'a­
Slll"<'.-.;, one l'C'JHCSt:'llt.iiig utilit.y and t.l1c ot.l!cr reprcsent­
itig co�t., t.o cn..cli goal or const.r;1i11t: a. most. coiJV<'llient 
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methodological property that is easier to appreciate 
by noticing that formalisms requiring such one-on-one 
associations fail to capl.lrrt' comp]Px relations between 
constraints (i .. e., expenditure of sornc resource con­
tributes to the attainment of multiple go<rls while nt.­
tainment of any goal entails use of several resources). 
Constraints that require attainment of some goal (e.g., 
"buy nice presents for Jim and Joe") and constraints 
that limit resource expenditure (e.g., "do not spend 
too much") are both sources of the same type of nwa­
sures, which evaluate the desirability of different state 
of affairs (i.e., "buying presents" is a somcc of prefer­
ence rneasures, and ':not speiJding too n1uchn is an­
other such source). Furthermore, e1·ery constraint,  
including those describing system behavior (e.g . . the 
laws of physics): is the so1Jrce of nt.ilit.y measJJrP� (<'.g., 
as functions of the costs associatt-�cl wit.l1 �irnplifying as­
sumptions that are usually not II Jet b,y any real .syst.eJJl. 
such as '"the container is filled with a perfect gas"). 
Our ideas also owe much to previons research, 
which established the close relationships between 
generalized rankings, operations research, and fuzzy 
logic [13ellman 80] and similarity-based semantics for 
that approximate logic [Rus pin i U 1]. In add iLion, we 
have been particularly moti vatcd by the need to pro­
vide practical bases for the generatio11 of sintiLrrity­
measures- the conceptual found0tions of a llalog ical 
reasoning tnethocls-- 011 the basis of the pra�ntat.ic ra­
tiotnle for the differentiation between alter11ati1·" so­
lutions, i.e., two scenarios resemble each other if they 
are equally prcfcrrablc in every relcvcutt rcgilrd . 
In closing this introduction, it is very importa11 1 to re­
mark that our synthesis of utilitarian and logic;tl con­
cepts is not the result of I:1 trivial confusion or whal 
is true and what is convenient. \Ve are simply stating 
that the truth value, measured in a multi,·aillcd sc;de, 
of propositions of the form: 
"The possible worlds is <Ill acccptl1hl" sol11tion,'· 
n1ay· he int.erprcted {1:'-; Llw r<'lat.ivt_' dcgrc<' of pr('r<'JTtlcc 
given to s frotJl a specific vi('wpoil!t.  
2 Possible Worlds and Desirabilities 
Our formalism is based on the notion of JWSsi/,fc II"Ur/d, 
whiclt will only be given a brief, infortrlld, cltaracter­
ization in this paper. Basically, a possible world, is 
any conceivable scenario: situation, or hciJa\'ior that 
may be used to describe the state ol· a re;d-world .sys­
tem. Each such situation is n1odclcd by a f"1111cl.ion, 
called a \-'<tluation, that assiglls a con\.('Jd.ioHal t.rllth­
valuc (i.e., either true or ralst>) to ('\"('f)' dcscripti\"(' 
statement, or proposition, about the syskllt. \\'!tile 
we will require that such t.nJt.lJ-assigtltJteut. ftiJlct.ic)][� 
be consistent with the rules of logic, II"!' 11·ill not place 
at this time any other restrictions 011 the natttr<' of 
such assignnw11ts. Thus, possible worlds 1nay corrc-
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spond to impossible physical situations, such as the 
state of idealized systems (e.g., "perfect gases"). 
The irnportance of the concept of of possible world, 
from a reasoning viewpoint, lies on its usefulness to 
model solutions of reasoning problems as subsets of 
possible worlds that satisfy certain constraints (i.e., 
observations, behavioral knowledge) that are usually 
called "evidence." From such a purely logical view­
point, a reasoning problem consists of the determina­
tion of the set of possible worlds that comply with pre­
scribed constraints. In a classical reasoning problem, 
the properties of interest are related to the relations of 
inclusion that hold bctiYcen the set of possible worlds 
t.lrat ;;atisfy the evidence and sets of possible worlds 
wltcre some proposition of interest, or h.l'pothcsis is 
tn1c . lu <-l uun1bcr of' illlport.ant c�1se:-: where �uch de­
t.erJJlitJa.t.ion is iillpos�iiJ l c, or riJ>f>FCJSiinnt.e rca:·;(>rJiup,· 
probl<onts, applicable appro<.lclws. described as approx­
irna.tc: reasoning Inethods, seck to det.enni11c ccrt.aiti 
properties of tile set of possiiJlc worlds tit at are consis­
tent witlt the evidence [l'luspini l!O]. 
llegardless of the nature of our problem , however, we 
lllil}" describe the object of reasoning as being that of 
assessing if a possible world is worthy of being called 
" solution. The usc of t.he qualifier "worthy" in the 
ahove seute11cc is not accidental. Frotn a prag;n1atic 
point of view, we I nay say that our aitn is t.o find useful 
sofllLioJJs. w l1ere ''uscfutness'' is dctennilled by coinpli­
<lltn• wit.h prohkrn coJJdit.ioJlS. Ci, ·e tl lllOrc rcprcseu­
t.at.ioiJid frecdon1 , \Y<' Jnny decide t.o ra.nk (e.g . . using; 
soJJJt> q11 antit.a.ti\·e tncasurcs) such usefulness and to 
spceak of the "quality" of a solution. 
Til is notion of utility as cognate of truth is rather easy 
to understand in connection with engineering prob­
lcnts, where the quality of the solution reflects the 
abilit.y of a device or system to perform adequately. In 
general, however, we niaJ' regard any problen1-solving 
proc<'ss as the identification of models (i.e ., sets of pos­
sil>lc 11·orlds) that. tncd statd constraints- including 
t.!Jose imposr�d by IIIC(-ISUI't�tnc>Jlt.s .:uJd observ<ttioll::-; -"to 
sOJIH' acccpt.ablc degree . 
l11 Sllllllllary, we 111ay S<IY t.lJc-d. \\"(' :-J(_'('k sol t 1tions witl1 
<l J!ltJniH'l' of' properties, eorresp<)l]ding; t.o coJnpliaJ\C(' 
\rit.]J con�t.raint.s, and t.!Jat. we an' \rilling to pay t.o dif­
fere nt extents to see tliilt tltose properties come about. 
At tltis point, however, it is important t.o m ake a fe1r 
points that ar(� essential to equa te tneasures of desir­
ability with meas ures of truth. 
First, we may note that, in a conventional Boolean 
context, every proposition pis cquiv.::-dent to a rnea.sure 
of tlte solution quality. a.s tneasurcd solely from such 
(l ,·iewpoint (i.e., '·ot . !Jcr things hcing equal). ln our 
f'ornJa]islll, we ruay sa,y that\\"<' have a f"ullct.ioll D1,, 
called a clcsiral>ility II IC'<:lSU rc . that. assigns a value of' 1 
to Clc·ry possihlc \\·oriel w l wn- I' is true (dcnot<:d 1c f-- p) 
and a value ofO to every possible world where it is false. 
In this case, this charactenstic Junction, in categorical 
fashion , what is acceptable and what is not. It. is often 
the case, however, that the desirability of a solution 
is a ntattcr of degree. Iu such cases, a. Jnosl natural 
generalization of the notion of characteristic function 
will be of value to model such graded prcf"crences: the 
concept of funy set [Zadeh G5]. 
Second, we must recognize that it will not be difficult 
to find problems where situation-dependent wishes and 
desires may not be easily expressed as a single num­
ber that quantifies preference. Furthermore, if we aim 
to associate the truth of any proposition p, not nec­
essarily specified as a problem constraint, with some 
utilitarian counterpart, we n1ust haw? son1c rnechanisn1 
to indicate that compliance with such proposition is ir­
relevant to the solution of the probkn1. Tlte simplest 
nwchanisrn to reprcs('nL such irrelcnulC<: is to idcnt.if'J: 
a fami ly of possi/,Jc desirability mcnsur<'S to be <tsso­
ciated with]!. which is easily done by idcntific;li.ioll ol" 
upper and lower bounds ["or D1,, thus g<' ll <' r<t liz i ug the 
notions of possibility and necessity of mocl<tl logic. 
Finally, we must remark that our functions, which arc 
constraint-dependent, represent. relative adequacy of 
alternative solutions with respect. to a set of ide;d so­
lutions that attain or exceed some associated "t<trget. 
value." Such ideal sol ut ions arc given a rel ative Jnca­
sure of adequacy that is equ al to I. 
It should be clear. however. that t.hc "absolute" use­
fulness associated with the .'mtisf"<Jct.iott or a p<irlicular 
goal should be given by some "utility" fuuct.ion (de­
fined along some suitahlc scale of ntcnsurc,ll<'llt. ) tlt<tl. 
loosely speak ing, rcprcs"ltts the over<dl util ity n"'oci­
atecl with its achievement. (e.g. if utility is lllc<Jsurcd 
in a monetary scale, we may say that the utility of p 
coming about is 8100). To limit. the scope of this p<�­
per, however, we shall confine ourselves to the discus­
sion of issues gern1cU1C to desirability nwa.snres, (1\"oid­
ing questions related to the absolute ut ilit.y ;Jssoci<Jt<'d 
with their achievenwnt. 
3 Desirability and P1·eference 
As informally introdun�d aiJovc, dcsirahility nwasl l rcs 
quantify the relative val11c of diff"crcnt. solut.io11s f"ront 
the viewpoint of a single constraint. or go<� I. 1\ltiJouglt 
that discussion was confined t.o "lloJwlnst.ic" goals, cor­
responding to subsets of possible worlds, t.IIC lllost. itt­
teresting applications of util itarian COIICcpt' im·oh · <' 
n1easures ranging over a rontinuous scale. 
3.1 Desirability Measures 
The siuiplcst. way to f"ol'lllillizc tlw ttut.io11 uf adcqtti\ry 
of a solution is that. of' a lllCi:lSlll'C t.ilat as::-;igJt:-; a \"i.dllC of 
relative desirability to any COJlcCi\·<-lhlc soltJ1.ion, a:-; de­
termined solely from tl1e 1·icwpoint of a sit1glc, specific 
go<d. In its simplest form, a solution corresponds to 
soJIIC fully specified description (i.e.,a possible world) 
; 1 ncl it 1nakes sense to st:ut. our fonnalisn1 with a real 
function defined over possible worlds ranging from 0, 
rcpn_•scnt.ing tot.a.l inadcq ttacy, to 1, representing total 
coiHpliaJJCe or satisfact.ioll with tlw goal . 
Ddiaitioa: A dtsirability 11;cusurc is a function D: 
/.( >- [0. 1], i.e. a fuzzy set in the universe U of possible 
worlds. 
The concept of desirability measure is a natural ex­
tension of the notion of "hard" or "crisp" constraint. 
The values D(w) may also be thought of as the truth­
values of the propositiou "The solution w is satisfac­
tory." The coucept.ual synthesis between desirability 
IIJcasuJ-cs and propositioual truth that this explicatiou 
i tl tplie.s kads to t.hf� cxtc-ttsiotl uf classical propositional 
;-\lg:ci)J·<I, along well kllO\\'l! !ill<':-:;. iuto a tnult.iva.lucd 
t Jwt.l t odolog;y for t.lwtr rat.iotl<d comhinatiou and ��g­
gn·g:t tiotl. 
lkforP discttssing sud1 J llc1 ltods, lJoWc\'(:'r, it is inlpor­
Lant to remark, o11cc agaiu , t!Jtlt. t.his conceptual uui­
fic<Jtion should not be iutcrpret.ed as an attempt to 
reduce issues of factual truth to matters of subjec­
tive c onve nie nce . Our view of truth as utility stems 
fro lll the same epistemological principles that led Pe­
ter \led a war to clcscri hc science <1s ''the art of the solv­
<lblc.'' \Ve aill  to qu<dify solution adequacy by measur­
illg t il<' extent by which pote11t.ial a11swers fit factual 
rc;t!ity and the constraints of the problem. Furthcr­
lllOL'C', \Vc n HJst. stress t.hat desirability measures qua u­
t.i t�· re!at.ive preferences bct\\'ccn solutions, fron1 a. lin1-
il<'d perspective, rather Llwn the overall desirability of 
a propos ition to c01ne a.b ont or its itnporta.nce a.n1ong 
various problern constra.ints. 
3.2 n.dations between Desirability Measures 
It would be rather odd if we were to say that a par­
ticular solution w is desirable from the viewpoint of a 
constr<� illt p. and th<�t it is also desirable from the lim­
ited perspecti'e of auother constraint q. but that it is 
rcllJCr tillllesir<�bic frolll till' viewpoint of the conjunc­
t. iort fJ A rJ. Ratioll a l COil�ideratioiJS [Trilla .:S 8G] sltow 
t.h;ll. dt>sirahility lllt�tl .. -;llre� rallki11g possible worlds by 
their ahilit.y to satisfy lite conjnnctiou of two con­
strtlints1 thelnsclvcs expressed by 1nea.us of the desir­
ability fu nctious D and D', arc related to such mea­
suITS hy the relation 
(D /\ D')(w)=D(w)rilD'(w), winU, 
w here the function @J is a triangular norm. 
Similarly, desirability rneasures quantifying the degree 
by wl1ich solutions meet the disjunction of two restric­
tions can be seen to be given by 
(D V D')(rc) = D(u) 1:7 D'(u'), w in U, 
where (j} is a. triangula1· cononn. 
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Since it is reasonable to ask that the desirability of the 
conjunction and of the disjnnctior1 of two gocls should 
not have an abrupt change when the dcsirabilities of 
the arguments are subject to slight variation, we would 
also require that ® and 1:!.t be continuous functions of 
both parameters. 
Furthermore, desirability measures that rank possible 
solutions by the degree by which they do not lllCCt 
some constraint. (expressed by a desirability D) are 
given by expressions of the form � D, where � is a 
strong negation function. 
It can also be seen that desirability measures !hat rank 
possible worlds by the extent by which they satisfy a 
conditional constraint of the forrn p�q, are reb ted to 
the clesirabilities D of }J and D' of 'I by the relation : 
(D�D')(w) = D'(w) , .. D(w), w here is the psr-u­
doinvcrse of a t.rian�uL-1r norm (�). 
The discussion above si 1uply rest.at.c rcsnlt.s in fuzr,�'-sct 
theory [Bellman 80. 1lubois S·l,Trillas 8�,Valvenk 8G] 
that. have been n::'cast. i1crc ill t.II(' cont.e.xt. of a poss"Jh!e­
worlds model t.o emp hasize the pa rallelism that exists 
between desir a bili t.y 1nca.su res a.nd generc1l ized t.ru th­
values. Actual choice of particular T-norms, couorms, 
and uegations depends on the semantics of the prob­
lem being considered, as a conjunction D/\D1 modeled 
using t.lw rninirnum T-nonn has considerably different 
properties than one beiug modeled using the: product 
T-nonn; being) in the fonner case 1 an assertion t.hat 
minimum standards for D aud D' must be l llcl , wltile 
in the latter declaring that tl1e degree of silt isfartion of 
one goal is exchangeable with the degree of satisfaction 
of the other. 
3.3 Preference Relations 
The assignment of desirability values t.o diverse propo­
sitions is often made using comparative measures that 
assess the advantage that a particular solution w has 
over a competiug alternative w' from the viewpoint of 
a specific constraint. Tlre ability to define such com­
parative functions oftcu simplifies tire evaluation of the 
effect of contextual considerations (e.g., tire desirabil­
ity of beiug iu auotlrcr pi<lce, if we are thirsty, depends 
ou how lll\Jc!t \\'a.t.er \\'t-: IJ;'I.v<-' ;-\ .Jld how ll lllch \\'at.er i'"' in 
tire other locat iou) . 
We will forrnalize t.his notion by considering functions 
of the form p(wlw') that map pairs of possil)le worlds 
t.o numbers between 0 and 1 so as to quantify the ex­
tent t.o which a possible world w is preferred to another 
w', from tire viewpoint of a particular constraint. \ Ve 
may think of p( w l w' ) as a measure of the amount of 
resources that we would be willing t.o spend t.o be in 
w rather than in w'. It is easy to see that any defi­
nition for p must comply with the following rational 
principles: 
1. No resources should be spent to be in w if we are 
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<llreacly in w. 
:!. If we arc williug to spenJ resources to be in w 
wheu we are in w', theu we should not spend any 
resources to be in -w' if we were in w 
:.l. The amount that we wouiJ be willing to pay to 
be iu w when we are in w" should be bound by 
above by a function of the amount that we would 
be willing to spend to be in w if we were in w' and 
of the amount that we would be willing to pay to 
be in w' if we \Vere in tun. 
These principles are captured by the following 
Defiuitiou: A function p mapping pairs of possible 
worlds into numbers bclwecn 0 aud 1 is called a fi­
l"'i-fneuce relation if aud only if 
I. p( wlw) = 0 for all ,,. in U. 
:!. If p(wlw') > 0, tlwn p(w'lwJ = 0 for all w ami 11'1 
inU. 
:l. Fm auy possible worlds w, w' ancl w" it. is 
p(wlw"):::; p(wlw') ff; p(w'lw"). 
It is also easy to see that if p has the semantics of a 
relation represeuting graded preference, then iB should 
be a COllOl'l1l. 
3.4 Relatious betweeu Desirabilities and 
Prefereuces 
The conthination and aggregation of preference rela­
tons is considerable more complex than that. of desir­
<�bilit.y lll<�asures as, for example. the negation � p of 
a preference relation (! is not itself a preference rela­
tion. [n order to develop au aggregation methodology, 
it is necessary first to study the relations that. exist 
between both types of utilitarian measures. 
Tile derivation of a f.f;-prefcrence relation PD from a 
desirabilit.J' 1ncasure D is l'<-tsily achieved by Inectns of 
tlw psC'udoiuversc · �. of+: 
(!u ( wlw') = D( w) •:C• D(w') . 
The inverse process of derivation of a uuique dc,;irabil­
ity 1neasure fro1n a preference relation is, in ge!leral, 
not possible. One of several representation theorems 
of Valverde [Valverde 85], exploiting in this case the 
identity 
p(wlw') = sup {p(wlw"J e p(w'lw")}' 
w" in ll 
assures, however, that there is always a family {Do} 
of desirability measures such that 
p(wlw') =sup {Do (w) 8 Do(w'J } . 
0 
The above representation has a rnost natural iuterpre­
t.ation as the set of constraints (i.e.1 desirability I11ca­
surcs) that are iuvolved in the generalized order de­
fined by a preference rdat.ion, i.e., the criteria that 
make a solution better thau another. As it is of­
ten the case with conventional constraints, some of 
these generalized constraints 1nay never be �>active," 
being, in effect, superseded by more specific restric­
tions. For this reason, tltc above deco1nposition is 
never unique [Jacas 87]. \Ve n1ay, however, always de­
fine a unique "canonica.l dccornposition," which is sug­
gested by the proofs of Valverde's theorems. We will 
call the family of desirability measures {Du} defiucd 
by 
Dw (w') = p(w' lw) , for every w in U . 
the Valverde repr·esentalion of p. 
Note that, although this definition essentially defines a 
mapping from every possible world w into a desirabil­
ity n1easure D((', tile collcct.ion of gcncra.tillg f'unctions 
titat is so defmed 11wy ii<lYC a cardin;dit.y that is consid­
erably smaller tlti\ll tlu1t. of U. The questioll of whctl�t'r 
there exists a. unique desirability D Ille'<l�llrc that gen­
erates p, i.e., p(wlw') = D( w) ce; D(ui), is, in view 
of the above conm1cnts, a m«Ucr of r<lllwr important 
practical significance that. was studied a.nd soh·cd by 
.J acas [J acas 87]. 
4 Combination of Preference 
Functions 
The ability to express ally prdercllce fullctioll (i.e. rel­
ative adequacy of solutions) in terms of a collection of 
desirability measures (i.e .. criteria for ndcqnacy) also 
suggests a natural <-dgebr<·lic .�tructure for preference 
relations. 
Definitiou: Let p aud p' be two preference rel<l­
tions in the universe of discourse U. Furthermore. let 
{ Dw } and { n;, } be the Valverde rcprescnt.at.ions 
of p and p1, respectively. rhcn the conjunction and 
disjunction of p and p' are the prel'crcnce fuucl.ious. 
denoted p \¥! p' and f' �' p', associated with the gen­
erating fcunilics { Dw ·!_, n:, .. } . a11d { Dw �11 n:u } , 
respectively. Furthermore, the complclneut of pis the 
preference relation,...,_, p associated with t.h(� generating 
family { � Dw }. Ji'iually, the implication preference 
p---+p1 is the preference rei at ion generated by the fnmily 
{ Dtv-D� } of desirability 1neasures. 
5 Possibility and Necessity 
It is often difficult to assess the adequacy of cer­
tain solutions (or particular aspects of such solutions), 
even from the limited perspective provided by specific 
problem-solving goals. While steering a mobile robot 
around an obstacle, for example, it. is hard to deter­
mine if a particular move is preferrable to another from 
the viewpoint. of a maneuver to be performed much 
later at a. ren1ote location. 
�lod;d logics [II nghes GS], by introduction of notions 
of po"ible and necessary truth, permit to represent 
states of ignorance about the potential truth of the 
difl'crent statements that are being reasoned about. 
In the formalism presented in this paper, where re­
st ric live propositions have been generalized as relative 
ttwasures of solution adequacy, the role of the necessity 
and possibility operators of modal logic is replaced by 
lower and upper bounds for measures of desirability 
and preference so as to generalize the modal implica­
tions Np�p�Ilp. for example, if we are fully igno­
ra tlt . nhout the adequacy of w as a. solution n1eeting 
a cons t raint represented by the desirability measure 
D, tlt<•n we may represent that fact by the bounds 
0 <:: D ( II' ) <:: I. 
We w ill say, tlterd'orc, t.h;d. a ft 1 1 tctio 11 Nu 1tt<tppi11g 
possihlc worlds u· into values between 0 and I is a ncc­
csso!'y desinibi!ity disll'ibutiun for a desirability l!lea­
snre D if Nu(w) <:: D(w) for all w in U. Similarly, we 
will say that Ilv is a Jwssible dcsimbility dist,.ibution 
forD if D(w) <:: Ilu(w) for all win U. 
The l'ollowing results permit to manipulate necessary 
ami possible dcsirabilities along lines that generalize 
si 111 i I ar derivation procedures for conventional modal 
logic: 
(a) If N_D is a necessary desirability for the com­
plcntcnt � D of D, then � N-u is a possible 
desirability for D. Similarly . if rr_D is a possible 
desirability for the complement � D of D, then 
� II-v is a necessary desirability for D. These 
rcl<tt ions arc the generalization of the well-known 
duality relations •N•Ji =: Ilp and •Il•p =: Np. 
(b) If N /J and Nv' are necessary desirability for D 
and D', respectively, then Nv @lND' and Nv !:17 
N IJ' are necessary desirabilities for D ® D' and 
D r:J D', respectively. A similar statement holds 
for possib le desirabilities. 
(c) If N D is a necc:ss<Jry desirability forD ami if Ilry 
is a possi ble clesir<thility forD'. tlwu Nu·c,rr/J' is 
a uccessary desirability for D' �D. A dual state­
""'"t also holds for possible dcsirabilities. 
Bou 11ds, c<tllednecessary an d JiOSsihlc preference ftrnc­
t.ions, ntay also be introduced to represent ignorance 
about relative preference between solutions. Rules for 
tlteir IIWnipulation, however, are considerabl y more 
cor11plcx than those for their desirability counterparts. 
A rat Iter straightforward consequence, nonetheless, of 
tltc definition of preference functions is that if if Nu 
and Ilv are necessary and possibility desirability dis­
tributions for a desirability measure D. then the func­
tions defined by the ex p ressions 
Np(wlw') = ND(w) 0 Ilv(w'), 
(:llld 
IIp(wlw') = Ill!(w) b Nu(w') , 
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are necessary and possible preferences for (JD(wlw') = 
D(w) 8 D(w'). 
It should be also clear that �tcccssary and possible 
preference functions can always be chosen to satisfy 
the first two properties (generalized non reflexivity ;mel 
antisymmetry) of the ddinition of prefcreuce function. 
Less obvious is the fact tit at a possible preference func­
tion may always be selected to satisfy the third (or 
transitive) property. Since then such possible prefer­
ence relation will be itself a preference relation, it may 
be representee! by a family Dw of desirability measures 
that is related to tlw Valverde represent.at .ion Dw of p 
by the inequality D" S D,.,. 
In closing this section, \\'C tn:ly note that, in gencrnl, it 
is more likely that a p ml>kll t-soher will I"· illt.cr<'stcd 
in issues of desirabili ty of a class of solutions or pref­
erence between classes of solutions rather tlt<1n the the 
corresponding questious for possible worlds. U nfort.u­
uately, it is not pos:::;ible to cha..ra.ctcrizc such general 
utilitarian concepts using lHitneric-valued fu11cLions as 
asessments of the utility of a proposition pas a solution 
clepencl on the particular world w f- 1' under consider­
ation. It is possible, hmrever, to define bounds 
Nv(P) = inf D(w) , and IID(JI) = iuf D(w) , 
wf-p 
which bound tl1e adequac y of any p-world. 
Note also that such ho 1 111ds may be gcncrcttcd front 
those of possible and necessary desirabili ty distribu­
tions for specific sol 11t.ions . Conversely, values for 
Nv(P) and Ilu(P) clefinecl for every )J in an exhaus­
tive, disjoint, partition {p1, p,, . . . p,} of the universe 
U may also be used to define possible and necessary 
possibility distributions by means of the ex pressions 
if "' f- Jii . 
The preference of p-worlds on·r q-worlds, cts tncasurecl 
from the viewpoint of a prdicrencc re lation (', t 1 1ay be 
si t11ilarly defiucd uslllg the expressions 
N,,(Jil'l) = i11f i11f p(wlw'), 
ICf-j> U:'f-q 
and 
Ilp(PI'I) = sup inf p(wlw'). 
wi-Jl w'f-q 
6 Preference, Similarity, and Fuzzy 
Logic 
A recent semantic model of the author [H .uspini 91] 
presentee! a rationale for the iuterpretation of the pos­
sibilistic structures of fuzzy logic and for its major rule 
of derivation on the basis of similarity relations be­
tween possible worlds. Si1 1 1ilarity relations S assign a 
value S(w, w') between 0 aml 1 to every pair of possi­
ble worlds w and w' in such a way that 
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1. S(w, w) = 1 for all possible worlds w, 
"2. S(w, w') = S(w', w) for all possible worlds w and 
w', and 
:3. S(w, w') :S S(w, w")®S(w", w') for all possible 
worlds w, w' and w", where @l is a 'T-norn1. 
Two possible worlds w and w' may be considered simi­
lar if, from the perspective of all constraints defining a 
problem, the solutions that they represent have close 
desirability values. This statement, reflected by the 
well known relation 
S(w, w') =min ( � p(w[w'), � p(w'[w) ) , 
pcrlllits derivation of a similarity relation from a pref­
erellce relatio11. 
l·:xt.c•nsions of the notion of similari t.y to allow defini­
ticm of bounds for the resemblance between p-worlcb 
ami q-n'orlds, called degre<C o[ illlplication and degree 
of corJ.sistence, which are abo the result, of applying 
a silllilar operation to the corresponding preference 
bounds N,(pfq) and II,(pfq), play an essential role 
in the interpretation of the possibility distributions of 
fuzzy logic. 
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